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Thompson: Foreword

FOREWORD
Peter N. Thompson †
“Hell, there are no rules here—we’re trying to accomplish
1
something.”—Thomas Edison
This issue of the William Mitchell Law Review presents articles
relating to the rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial.
The articles address how rules impact the fairness of the trial
process, how rules might affect behavior outside of the courtroom,
and how rules can influence the perception of justice. Legal rules,
of course, put limits on the tribunal’s unfettered discretion. They
require judges to reflect on the policy embodied by the rule, not
the policy preferred by the judge. Many judges, including
Minnesota Supreme Court justices, chafe at the restrictions
imposed by rules and identify instead with Thomas Edison’s more
pragmatic approach suggested in the quote above.
Justice Simonett, one of the great Minnesota Supreme Court
Justices, wrote about the constraining impact of legal rules in his
frequently cited article about “result-oriented” judicial decision
2
making. Following legal rules requires that judges and justices
subordinate their values and preferences for the values expressed
in the rule. Of course he recognized the vital role legal rules
played in limiting ad hoc decision making in our democratic
government. Justice Simonett, quoting Alexander Hamilton,
stated, “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts . . . it is
indispensible that they should be bound down by strict rules and
† Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, Acting Dean from
1987 to 1989. B.A. DePauw University, J.D. University of Michigan. Law Clerk to
U.S. District Court Judges Miles W. Lord and Edward Devitt. Assistant and
Associate Professor at William Mitchell College of Law from 1973 to 1977.
Reporter and subsequent chair for the Minnesota Supreme Court Committee on
Rules of Evidence.
1. MICHAEL J. GELB & SARAH MILLER CALDICOTT, INNOVATE LIKE EDISON: THE
SUCCESS SYSTEM OF AMERICA’S GREATEST INVENTOR 6 (2007).
2. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984).
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precedent, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
3
particular case that comes before them.” Nonetheless, Justice
Simonett argued that judges should not slavishly enforce rules;
rules need to be applied with some flexibility, or as he phrases it,
4
with “elasticity.” Flexibility and elasticity seem apt descriptions for
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach to applying rules of
evidence.
Minnesota Courts followed common law rules of evidence
until July 1, 1977, the effective date of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence. The process of developing Minnesota’s first evidentiary
code took three years. Chief Justice Sheran first convened the
Advisory Committee in 1974. He instructed the committee to
consider the newly enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as a model
and to propose a rule that deviated from the federal rule only
where a significant state policy conflicted with the federal
5
approach. After two years of monthly meetings and two public
hearings the committee sent a recommendation to the court. The
rules were promulgated by the court consistent with Minnesota
6
Statutes section 480.0591 (1974). The committee followed the
direction of the chief justice. The promulgated rules were quite
similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence with only a couple dozen
differences.
The implementation of the new evidence rules appeared to
cause very few problems in Minnesota trial practice. It was not
until eleven years later that the Advisory Committee was
7
reconvened to consider amendments. The main concern then was
to make the rules gender neutral. A few amendments were
implemented with minor changes—adding gender-neutral
language and modifying the rules to conform to judicial decisions.
The rules were not reviewed or amended again for another decade.
Remarkably, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence have been amended
only twice in the past thirty years.
3. Id. at 201 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
4. Id. at 203.
5. See generally PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINN. PRAC. EVIDENCE § 101.01 (3d
ed. 2001) (describing the history of the development of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence).
6. Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 480.0591 (2008).
7. See Order Appointing Members to Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evidence 1, 1 (1988) available at http://www.mncourts.gov/
Documents/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Rules%20of%20Evide
nce%20C3-84-2138/1988%20Rls%20of%20Evid%20Appt%20Orders.pdf.
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As a participant on each advisory committee that
recommended the rules to the court, I like to think that the rules
were well crafted with nuanced attention to the culture and sound
practices in Minnesota courts, and that, of course, they are
acceptable and workable rules. I actually believe this is a fair
conclusion based on my conversations with trial judges throughout
the state. Once every dozen years, then, is sufficient to review the
text of the rules. On the other hand, after years of reading
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, a second possibility has
begrudgingly crept into my consciousness. The rules of evidence
that I have devoted a career to teaching, drafting and chronicling
really do not matter that much to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Elasticity and flexibility, not textual or policy analysis, are the
linchpins of evidence law in the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The shift from common law rules to codified rules based on
federal standards meant that the Minnesota Supreme Court was
supposed to relinquish its central role in controlling the values and
policies embedded in the rules of evidence in deference to advisory
committees and federal authorities. Giving up power is a difficult
thing to do.
8
The Minnesota Supreme Court in its order of promulgation
reserved the right to modify, supersede, or otherwise amplify
specific rules of evidence in its decisions without resorting to
administrative rulemaking procedures. Instead, the supreme court
9
has largely ignored the rules of evidence, or at best it treats the
rules as general standards that do not really constrain judicial
decision making, but set wide parameters for judicial discretion.
The rules are like traffic signs on the highway. These signs are to
be carefully followed by those unsure of how to get to a destination.
They may be ignored, however, by those with a keen sense of where
8. See Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence (Minn. Apr. 1, 1977),
reprinted in 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. VII–VIII (West 1980), cited in Goeb v. Tharaldson,
615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000)).
9. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, §301.03 (stating “[t]he adoption of Rule 301
[presumptions] has had little impact on the law of presumption in Minnesota.
The rule is rarely cited by the appellate courts and has yet to be carefully analyzed
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Even after the adoption of Rule 301, courts
continue to use the term presumption to refer to substantive rules of law and
resolve presumption issues on an ad hoc case by case, presumption by
presumption approach.”). See also George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 12–13
(Minn. 2006) (finding it proper to take judicial notice of American mortality
tables but not Liberian mortality information from the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK
without referring to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 201).
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they are going and believe they know a shortcut.
For the most part, however, the process seems to be working
tolerably well. The evidence rules were based on common law
principles gleaned from the court’s past decisions. They embody
the longstanding view in Minnesota and elsewhere that the
decisions whether to admit or exclude evidence should be
committed to trial court discretion. So, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decisions, which are usually based on sound common law
judgment, do not often directly conflict with the text and policy
behind the rule. In these cases where the court’s judgment squares
with the text of the rules, the rules are helpful to the court in
10
explaining its decisions. But clearly the text or policy behind the
evidence rules is not a starting point in the court’s consideration.
Contrast the state experience with the history of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. When addressing evidence issues the federal
courts tend to focus carefully on the text and policy behind the
evidence rule. The Federal Rules of Evidence are enacted by
statute, which perhaps justifies a different approach in
11
Involving the legislature in the process may also
construction.
12
The Federal
politicize the rules and the rulemaking process.
Rules of Evidence are in a constant state of reexamination and
amendment. But where the text of the rules matters in federal
10. For example, Rule 403 is frequently cited by the court as justification for
affirming the trial judge’s admission of evidence. See generally James A. Morrow et
al., Weighing Spreigl Evidence: In Search of a Standard, 60 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 23
(Nov. 2003). Rarely has Rule 403 been carefully analyzed. Id.
11. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand
Theories of Statutory Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 395–96 (1966) (arguing for a textual
approach to interpreting the rules of evidence); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (arguing the court should rely on the Advisory
Committee Notes in construing the rules of evidence); Andrew E. Taslitz,
Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic
Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 399 (1995) (calling for the court to be
more candid in identifying the basis for construing the rules of evidence,
recognizing the limitation of linguistics as an interpretive technique); Glen
Wassenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539 (1999) (advocating
that the rules should be construed from an historical perspective as a codification
of common law).
12. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002) (providing a history of the federal rules
of evidence and discussing symposia articles on the topic of the Politics of
[Evidence] Rulemaking).
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courts, in Minnesota the text and underlying policy of the rule
provide only a general standard that may or may not guide the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the resolution of an issue.
The treatment of expert testimony presents a prime example
of the contrasting approach to construing rules by the United
States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court. In the
now famous United States Supreme Court decision Daubert v.
13
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
strained to draw the workings of the new federal approach to
14
expert testimony from the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
The United States Supreme Court provided a definition of science
drawn from the text of Rule 702 and carefully explained how this
15
The recent Federal
rule relates to the other evidentiary rules.
Vaccine Court cases regarding the possible link between vaccines
and autism provides another opportunity to assess the role of
science in the law, which Professor Joëlle Moreno addresses in this
16
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the Daubert
issue.
17
In its opinion the Minnesota
approach in Goeb v. Tharaldson.
Supreme Court largely ignored the text of Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 702, identical to the federal rule, except in
acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had relied on
18
the text. The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that it did not
have to address Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 because
subsequent to the promulgation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence
702 the court “transformed the standard for admissibility in
19
Minnesota into the two prong Frye-Mack standard and reaffirmed
20
adherence to Frye-Mack in State v. Schwartz.” In Mack, the court
addressed the admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony,
without a single reference to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702,
effectively ignoring the rules of evidence. In Schwartz, the
Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the application of Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 702, which the court referred to as a relevancy
13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
14. Id. at 588.
15. Id. at 589–90.
16. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, It’s Just a Shot Away: MMR Vaccines and Autism and
the End of the Daubertista Revolution, WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1511 (2009).
17. 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000).
18. Id. at 810.
19. Id. at 813–14. See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989);
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
20. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 810.
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rule. Rather than focusing on the rule, however, the court
reasoned that the issue had already been decided in Mack.
At best the Minnesota Supreme Court treats rules of evidence
as general standards, not real rules constraining choices. Thus,
policy choices are retained by the court and not given to an
advisory committee or rulemaking body. But, as Hamilton warned,
where there are no clear constraining rules, decision making can
21
be ad hoc and inconsistent. Of course this can lead to confusion,
particularly if the court does not clearly articulate how its decisions
deviate from the text and policy of the published rules.
Professor Sampsell-Jones recognizes this problem in the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Rule 404(b) decisions, which he
22
politely refers to as “not very sensible.” The Minnesota Supreme
Court’s expansive approach to the admissibility of uncharged
misconduct renders the text of the rules of evidence meaningless.
In my view, Professor Sampsell-Jones strikes at the heart of the
problem when he suggests the Minnesota Supreme Court is not
entirely sold on a key value expressed in the text and policy of
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404 that propensity evidence is to be
avoided except in narrowly defined situations. Notwithstanding the
rules of evidence, which severely limit propensity evidence, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has never quite given up on the notion
that the jury must be able to see the “whole person” when a
23
Perhaps as recommended in the
defendant appears at trial.
article, new legislation would constrain the court, but if the
legislation did not conform to the court’s core value and abolish
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.” Id.
22. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Spriegl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled Rule,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1368 (2009).
23. The reference to seeing the whole person comes up in the context of
admitting past convictions under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609. While the rule
contemplates admitting only convictions that are probative on the issue of
credibility as a witness, the court takes an expansive approach to admitting past
convictions under a pre-rules theory that the jury should see the “whole person.”
See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007) (referring to pre-rules “whole
person” concept and concluding that a conviction has impeachment value
because it allows the jury to see the “whole person”); State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d
19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (using “whole person” concept to admit prior conviction).
Professor Sampsell-Jones has also chronicled the Supreme Court’s flawed
approach in applying Rule 609. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Minnesota’s Distortion of
Rule 609, 31 HAMLINE. L. REV. 405 (2008).
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the propensity rule, I am not hopeful we will find the “principled
rule” we all should be seeking.
Sugiska and Herr provide invaluable insight into specific
24
evidentiary issues implicated by advances in electronic technology.
They note the Minnesota Court’s reluctance to change established
rules to accommodate new issues and trust in the continued good
judgment of the judiciary. They do not recommend constraining
judicial choices by promulgating new rules. In their article they
discuss one of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s few decisions on
questions relating to authentication, Furlev Sales & Associates, Inc. v.
25
North American Automotive Warehouse, Inc. In Furlev Sales the court
ignored the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and imposed an
elaborate, highly technical seven-part foundational test for the
admissibility of tape recordings. Requiring technical foundational
26
elements is inconsistent with the text and spirit of Minnesota Rule
27
of Evidence 901.
Again the court did not refer to or cite the
applicable rule of evidence.
Although the rules may not constrain the Minnesota Supreme
Court, they likely affect the behavior of trial judges and may impact
Minnesota citizens. Professors Jesson and Knapp provide their
scholarly take on legislation aimed at creating an evidentiary
privilege for a statement of apology in the high-stakes medical
28
malpractice arena. They note that thirty-five states have passed
statutes providing some type of privilege in an attempt to
encourage medical professionals to maximize the therapeutic value
of the apology. The statutes are intended to allow medical
personnel the opportunity to express heartfelt regret, remorse,
sympathy, or even responsibility for an adverse outcome without

24. See Keiko L. Sugisaka & David F. Herr, Admissibility of E-Evidence in
Minnesota: New Problems or Evidence as Usual?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1453 (2009).
25. 325 N.W.2d 20, 28 n.9 (Minn. 1982).
26. One of the Furlev Sales requirements is that there must be a showing that
the taped testimony was voluntary and made without any inducement. Id. This
may or may not be an issue relating to admissibility in criminal cases, but it should
not be included as a general requirement for admissibility of a tape recording.
27. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the Furlev Sales test while
addressing the admissibility of taped telephone conversations. See Turnage v.
State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2006). The court actually quoted the text of
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901(a), but it provided no analysis or any discussion
about how the technical Furlev Sales requirements square with the text or policy of
the rule. Id.
28. See Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m Sorry:
Lawyers, Doctors, and Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410 (2009).
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fear of triggering a large malpractice suit or judgment.
The authors fully document the therapeutic value of candid
and honest doctor-patient communication following an adverse
result. They are concerned, however, that providing a legal
statutory privilege will embroil the apology in the midst of the
adversary process, and the apology will lose its therapeutic and risk
management benefit. They fear that apologies will cease to be a
doctor’s honest expression and will be delivered, and, perhaps
more important, be perceived as part of a risk management strategy
to avoid litigation. Apparently rules do matter.
Of course rules matter, particularly if American citizens
perceive that the rules are crafted in an unfair and one-sided
manner. Professor Hansen’s timely article critiquing the Military
Commissions Process reminds us of core values shared by most
Americans: the adjudication process should be designed to provide
29
all parties a fair opportunity to contest their charges. The rules
should be fair. While in time of war, and under threat of terror,
Americans may be willing to put greater trust in the Executive
branch or the military. But perhaps this trust was strained by the
one-sided, seemingly unfair tribunals set up to try enemy
combatants under the Military Commissions Act. Hansen suggests
that the traditional evidentiary rules applicable in American
tribunals, and as codified in the Military Rules of Evidence, should
not be casually cast aside. Deviations from traditional evidentiary
rules should be based on sound reasons, not unsupported
assumptions or attempts to assure that the tribunal will return only
guilty verdicts.
30
Professors Scallen and Cribari address constitutional rules.
They discuss different aspects of the United States Supreme Court’s
retake on the right to confrontation stemming from Crawford v.
31
Washington. Cribari probes the analytical roots of the decision,
which includes dicta suggesting that the right to confrontation is
32
The Minnesota
not applicable to preclude dying declarations.
29. See Victor Hansen, The Usefulness of a Negative Example: What We Can Learn
About Evidence Rules From the Government’s Most Recent Efforts to Construct a MilitaryCommission’s Process, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1480 (2009).
30. See Stephen J. Cribari, Is Death Different? Dying Declarations and the
Confrontation Clause after Crawford, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1542 (2009); Eileen A.
Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and other Challenging
Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558 (2009).
31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
32. Id. at 56 n.6.
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Supreme Court has already ruled on that point and, according to
the Minnesota Court, the admissibility of dying declarations is not
33
affected by the right of confrontation. The Minnesota Supreme
Court did not address the difficult policy questions identified by
Cribari, but relied on stare decisis to justify the result. Cribari
makes the point that constitutional rulemaking can be complex in
a pluralistic, multicultural society. As Cribari points out, simple
constitutional rules cannot make the world simple.
The complexity of the “simple” new rule for confrontation
rights is plumbed in Professor Scallen’s article on confrontation
and forfeiture in domestic and child abuse cases. Crawford has had
its biggest impact in these cases. Prior to Crawford the repeated
experience of child or domestic abuse victims who were unable or
unwilling to stand up and provide trial testimony against a parent,
spouse or “loved one” had led to evidentiary innovations and
relaxed applications to permit hearsay statements to be admitted at
trial. The simple rule in Crawford, that these testimonial statements
are not admissible unless subject to cross-examination, may have
had a devastating impact on prosecutions of abuse.
34
Recently in Giles v. California, the United States Supreme
Court held that forfeiture of the Sixth Amendment right to
confront must include a showing that the defendant’s actions were
intended to prevent testimony or cooperation in criminal
prosecutions. Justice Scalia may have thrown a lifeline, or a way out
of “simplistic rulings,” by suggesting that to prove forfeiture the
court may consider “evidence that the abuse or threats were
35
intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help.”
The articles in this issue confront current evidentiary issues in
a number of different contexts. An underlying premise of each
33. See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 585–86 (Minn. 2005) (admitting
shooting victim’s statement, “Call the police. Jeff and Lenair.” as a dying
declaration). To the court’s credit the opinion includes both an analysis of
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and a complete analysis of the Crawford
opinion. On a related issue, the Minnesota court’s conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment provided some type of right to confrontation when facing nontestimonial hearsay proved to be wrong. Id. at 584. See Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (stating that the right to confrontation was not applicable to
non-testimonial statements), abrogation recognized by State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d
258, 265 n.5 (Minn. 2008).
34. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008). The decision was inconsistent with an earlier
Minnesota Supreme Court decision that was subsequently vacated. See State v.
Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258, vacated, Moua Her v. Minnesota, 129 S.Ct. 929 (2009).
35. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2693.
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article is that the choice of the evidentiary rule to be used in the
trial is an important decision. Evidence rules should not be
applied on an ad hoc basis divorced from precedent, policy, text,
and context. Rather than impeding just results, evidence rules
should consistently produce just results.
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